Администрация города Нижнего Новгорода
Муниципальное бюджетное образовательное учреждение гимназия № 67
603014, г. Н.Новгород, ул. С. Перовской, д.5 ГРКЦ ГУ Банка России потел. 831-270-03-69,Нижегородской области г.Н.Новгород
тел/факс 831-224-14-58 БИК 042202001
E-mail: firstname.lastname@example.orgР/с 40204810700000760001
ИНН 5259012845лицевой счет: 000754754
Научное общество учащихся
«Contrast London.Economic impact of immigration. »
Выполнила: Дубровина Мария,
ученица 9 б класса
1. Chapter 1: Melting pot of different nationalities in the area of one city, London
1.1. A population history of London...................
1.2. Its population composition today……………………………………..
1.3. Problems that accompany migration gain.............................
1.4. What can be done?...............................................................2. Chapter 2: What immigrants have brought to the life of London. Economic Impacts of Immigration to the capital
2. Impact of Immigration on GDP per Head…………………………………………...
2.4. Fiscal Impacts……………………………………..
3. Chapter 3: Rising level of Social stratification as a result of all processes
Being British is about driving in a German car to an Irish pub for a Belgian beer, then travelling home, grabbing an Indian curry or a Turkish kebab on the way, to sit on Swedish furniture and watch American shows on a Japanese TV. And the most British thing of all – suspicion of anything foreign.
When I was in London, I was struck by the contrast of this city, its mixture of good and bad, beautiful and terrible, rich businessmen and homeless people, bright areas and dark criminal ones of London. I was wondering what things have made the look of the capital what it is today. I started reading different sources on specific subject and begun to learn new information for me, historical facts. It turned out that immigration processes left its huge mark on the structure of London.
In connection with past events in the world we can say that new wave of immigrants begins in Europe. This could not hurt the UK and London including. The number of migrants working in Britain has risen by more than a quarter in three months. Today the problem of immigration and social stratification is one of the most pressing, actual and interesting.
The object of my research is social stratification in London. And the subject is the formation of social stratification under the influence of immigration.
For myself, I have set the following objectives, which will be revealed in my scientific work:
Investigate the history of immigration processes in London;
Investigate the composition of the city;
Investigate the manifestation of social stratification in the capital of the UK;
Investigate the influence of immigration on the rising level of social stratification;
Develop to develop ways of participation of each of us to correct the terrible situation.
To achieve the objectives I have set myself the following tasks:
Find the information about waves of immigrants to London;
To analyze the ethnic and social composition of the city; find tables, charts, maps;
Learn what is the situation with the poor in the UK;
To make a link between immigration processes and social stratification;
My research is theoretical in nature and I used the appropriate research methods:
studying and summarizing
analysis and synthesis
induction and deduction
axiomaticsThe theoretical significance of my research lies in the fact that I based on exploring themes of immigration and social stratification showed the contrasting city of London.
The practical significance of my research lies in the fact that the work can be used in a school course of social Science.
To complete this investigation effectively I looked at studies from professors, statistics, documentaries, case studies and my personal opinion.
Chapter 1: Melting pot of different nationalities in the area of one city, London
London is often described as an ‘international city’, once primarily in relation to its imperial role, but since the 1980s more broadly as a ‘global city’ serving the whole world. The main justification for this title has been the concentration of many dynamic ‘command and control’ functions for an increasingly integrated world economy, most notably in and around the City itself (e.g. Sassen, 1991). An equally remarkable and even more pervasive kind of internationalization of the city in this period has been in its population, which has become dramatically more diverse over the past 20 years, with large numbers of new migrants from many places, most of which (unlike the homes of earlier post war migrants) were never part of the British Empire.
The reasons why people have travelled from overseas to London – for work, refuge, stimulus, profit, personal development and pleasure – are almost as varied as their origins, but by no means unique to this city. Many large urban centers have a history of immigration, some on a much larger scale than was the case for London – for example Toronto, Los Angeles, Sydney and New York – but these too have experienced large new waves over recent decades which have a very similar character to that affecting London. Other European cities, like Paris and Amsterdam, are also experiencing more cosmopolitan (as well as larger) inflows now, if not to the same degree as London. In all these cases it is very much bound up with their urban character, their openness, economic vitality, existing cultural diversity and concentrations of economic, social and power. The relationship, however, seems to be a two way one, with a strong belief at least that the presence (and turnover) of migrants from a wide variety of origins will contribute strongly to all of these urban assets – if also probably to the accompanying tensions and problems endemic in such cities.
1.1A population history of London
Humanity's first 'world city' was a seething and constantly growing metropolis of the young. Migrants and immigrants filled its neighborhoods and gave to each one a distinctive character, which in turn changed decade by decade as new waves of both the desperate and the hopeful from Britain and across the world came to occupy the bright streets and dingy courts of the capital.
In terms of its population London overshadowed all other British and almost all European cities even in the late seventeenth century and continued to do so throughout the next two and a half centuries. By the early twentieth century it dwarfed its largest competitors, and formed an urban machine for living that was unprecedented in human history. From a population of around half a million when the Proceedings began publication in 1674, London reached a staggering population of over seven million by the time they ceased in 1913. From a city which was just starting to spill beyond the confines of the ‘Square Mile’, by 1913 London marched across the landscape, some seventeen miles from end to end.
This pattern of growth was not steady, nor was it entirely down to any single factor. But between them a gradual and punctuated decline in child mortality, in combination with in-migration, from the British Isles, Europe and the rest of the world, were decisive. The city that was created in the process was marked by its youth and its high proportion of women, drawn to the capital by domestic service.
1674-1715 In the mid-1670s, when the Proceedings began to be published, the population of the capital was approximately 500,000. Fourteen years later, Gregory King, Britain’s first great demographer, estimated it at 527,000. This was a period of low overall population growth, even stagnation in England and was characterized by a very late age at marriage, low illegitimacy rates, and relatively low levels of birth within marriage. These factors impacted just as much on the population of London as on that of the country as a whole, and were exacerbated by particularly high levels of urban infant mortality. As a result, the last three to four decades of the seventeenth century and the first two decades of the eighteenth are a period characterized by slow incremental growth. It is also a period during which a high proportion of London's inhabitants were migrants. Most women came as domestic servants seeking employment, while young men sought apprenticeships or more casual labor. One estimate suggests that a sixth of all people born in England around 1700 lived some part of their lives in London. It was only by maintaining this constant influx that the capital could possibly maintain its population and grow.
The combination of low overall fertility rates with high levels of migration substantially skewed the age structure of London. Low fertility rates, for instance, generally result in a low overall dependency ratio (the number of old and young people supported by the working population). For England as whole this ratio reached its lowest point in the 1670s. Because a high number of London's inhabitants were relatively young recent migrants over the age of 14, the effect would be even more powerfully felt in the capital. In other words, London in the late seventeenth century was not a city of children or the elderly. Instead, it was dominated by young men and women in their teens and twenties.
During the seventeenth century migration tended to be long distance and international. As a result, besides its youth, London's population in this period was also characterized by its diversity. All the regions and countries that made up the British Isles were well represented by self-conscious communities of migrants. Specific neighborhoods were associated with Yorkshire, Scotland and Ireland. At the same time the Huguenot refugees from France successfully carved out a distinct district for themselves in Spitalfields; while Sephardic Jews and Ashkenazim from Poland and Germany settled around Whitechapel and Petticoat Lane. The Irish came to dominate the area around St Giles in the Fields, which came to be known as "Little Dublin".
1715-1760 By 1715 the population of London had reached around 630,000; rising to approximately 740,000 by 1760. Population growth in this period was not, however, evenly spread. Steady growth up to around 1725 was followed by a period of relative stagnation to mid-century, followed in turn by stronger growth during the 1750s. Poor hygiene, living conditions and the "gin craze" are frequently cited as explanations for the high mortality rate, and demographers have in particular pointed to the extremely high rate among infants (20.2 deaths per 100 live births by the age of 2 years in the period 1730-9).
Changing attitudes towards child mortality in this period are reflected in both the establishment of institutions such as the Foundling Hospital in 1741; and in the Proceedings themselves, by the decline in prosecutions for infanticide noticeable from the 1730s onwards, as efforts shifted towards supporting single mothers rather than shaming them. The stagnation or very slow growth of the population of London in this period was also reflected by a marked depression in the building industries.
1760-1815 From approximately three-quarters of a million people in 1760, London continued a strong pattern of growth through the last four decades of the eighteenth century. In 1801, when the first reliable modern census was taken, greater London recorded 1,096,784 souls; rising to a little over 1.4 million inhabitants by 1815. No single decade in this period witnessed less than robust population growth.
In part this urban bloat resulted from a marked decline in infant mortality brought about by better hygiene and childrearing practices, and a changing disease pattern. By the 1840s children born in the capital were three times less likely to die in childhood than those born in the 1730s.
But much more important than mortality was increased migration and rising fertility. Long distance migration within the Britain Isles declined (with the exception of migration from Ireland), and was replaced by a higher level of regional migration, with London attracting large numbers from the home counties and from communities with strong links to London through coastal shipping. As a result, many more Londoners came to have family and friends back home within a few days walk than they would have done in the seventeenth century. This also ensured that the social identity of communities defined by a region of origin within the British Isles became relatively less important.
At the same time, international, and indeed global, migration (both economic and forced) became more significant. Following the end of hostilities at the conclusions of the Seven Years War in 1763 and the American War in 1783, a large number of black men and women from Africa, the Caribbean and North America settled in London. By the last quarter of the eighteenth century the black population of London is estimated to have been between 5,000 and 10,000. The outcome of the American War in particular also resulted in the establishment of a large American loyalist community, both white and black.
Marriage patterns evolved rapidly. From having a demographic regime at the turn of the seventeenth century in which people married in their late 20s and had relatively few children, in or out of wedlock, a new pattern took over in London from as early as the 1730s and was well established by the 1760s. This new regime was characterized by high levels of illegitimacy, an average marriage age of below 25, and high overall levels of fertility both within and outside marriage. This reflected a profound change in the behavior of the still typically young and migrant inhabitants of London.
Throughout this period women continued to dominate the population as a whole. In 1801 54% of Londoners were female. This both reflected the importance of domestic service in drawing young people to London and exacerbated the impact of changing patterns of courtship and fertility.
1815-1860 In 1815 London was already the largest city in the world, but by 1860 it had grown three-fold to reach 3,188,485 souls. And many of the souls it contained were from elsewhere. In 1851, over 38 per cent of Londoners were born somewhere else.
The Irish made up perhaps the single largest immigrant group. In 1841, when the first census to record the birthplace of Londoners was taken, 4% of the population were from Ireland, representing 73,000 individuals. This rose to 109,000 in 1851 in the wake of the Great Famine (1846-9). A further 13,000 Londoners were from elsewhere in Europe and the rest of the world (rising to 26,000 in 1851). French, Italian, German and Spanish refugees (both economic and political) all formed substantial communities in London during these decades – many forced to flee following the political and economic disorder associated with the revolutions of 1830 and 1848. Added to these were smaller communities of Chinese, Indian and African sailors, living and working along the riverside. And finally, there was a thriving and substantial Jewish community, replenished decade by decade by further European migration.
As in earlier periods, however, the vast majority of the migrants who fuelled London’s remarkable population growth were from Britain, and in particular, from the counties and regions of the South East. As a result, Londoners continued to be both younger and more likely to be female than the inhabitants of other British regions. As in the preceding period, the first half of the nineteenth century also witnessed a steady decline in both child and adult mortality, primarily as a consequence of better sanitation, building standards and food supplies. For the first time, London ceased to be a sink of mortality for rural emigrants, as its death rate came to into line with that of the surrounding counties.
1860-1913 The last half of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth saw continued strong growth, in some ways replicating and reinforcing the pattern set in preceding decades. The over three million people living in Greater London in 1861 more than doubled to become over seven million by the 1910s. During the same period, the flow of European immigrants rose from a steady stream to a regular river of humanity, while migration from the wider world also grew in importance.
Reflecting increasing fertility rates, by 1901 the proportion of Londoners born elsewhere had declined to just 33% of the total, but with the growing size of the new megalopolis the number of new migrants was nevertheless huge. And while the Irish born population of London declined from 107,000 in 1861 to just 60,000 in 1901, other groups came to take their place in the hard-scrabble economy of immigrant London.
The great revolutions and political struggles of late nineteenth-century Europe brought many from Russia, Poland, France, Italy and Germany - including revolutionaries and political activists such as Karl Marx. But most came to work, or to escape persecution. In 1901 there were 27,400 Germans, 11,300 Frenchmen and women, and 11,000 Italians. But most prominent of all the immigrant communities were the Jews. From the 1860s in particular, the well established London Jewish community was dramatically expanded by those fleeing conscription into the armies of the Austrian Empire, and famine in Russia in 1869-70. The Russo-Turkish War of 1875-6 created a new batch of refugees, but it was in the 1880s, and as a result of the persecution of the Jews in both Russia and Prussia, that most came. It is estimated that by 1901 there were 140,000 Jews living in London, three times as many as two decades earlier.
Chinese and Indian immigrants became a more prominent and established part of the London whirl in these same years, while Indian sailors, and a small, but significant African and Black Caribbean community continued to prosper. The Pan-African Conference was held in London in 1900; reflecting the extent to which the capital acted as the centre of imperial dissent as much as the centre of the imperium. The 1901 census recorded 33,000 Londoners as having been born in British colonies or dependencies.
Modern migration waves to London
During the first Great Age of Migration (and globalisation) before the First World War, the UK (like Europe in general) was involved primarily as a place of origin rather than as an important destination for international flows – except in its role as asylum for refugees from Russia. During the first half of the 20th century, particularly in the 20s and 30s, international migration was much more limited – and London’s core activities became more insulated from international influences – while the emergence of a new round of refugee flows in the late 1930s had rather little impact on the UK, although it brought some distinguished migrants to London.
In Europe generally, the period since the Second World War has been one of very much larger scale migration, both into and within the continent, though with markedly shifting patterns, several of which have had distinctive impacts on London. In broad terms, we can distinguish four sub-periods in which different processes have operated to quite different effects:
Post-war resettlement: On the continent, the aftermath of the war (and the division of Germany) brought massive movements, with many millions of people being repatriated, forcibly displaced or voluntarily seeking asylum. The driving forces were almost entirely political, but with very major economic effects, notably in providing a large boost to West German labour supply growth, continuing through the 1950s until the Wall halted the refugee flow from East Germany. The impact of these flows on the UK was more modest, but a few hundred thousand ‘European Volunteer Workers’ were recruited by the post-war Labour government, primarily from Displaced Persons camps, and directed to employment in ‘essential industries’, mostly production sectors where labour was in short supply. At the time this source of supply was chosen over the importation of non-white workers from British colonies, who were seen as less socially acceptable (Kay and Miles, 1992). Because of the targeted sectors, these flows were mostly directed to areas of the country away from London.
Managed labour importation: Through the 1950s and 1960s, most northern European countries actively promoted labour immigration as a tool of economic policy, drawing in workers from outside northern Europe on a basis initiated and managed jointly by a combination of the states concerned and major employers in search of replacement labour. The arrangements took different forms in different countries, with a major contrast between the Germanic nations. Citizenship was defined by descent and foreign migrants had the status strictly of guest workers (gastarbeiter), and the main colonial powers (such as the UK), where most of the new migrants either already had 12 citizenship rights or could readily acquire them. There were also significant differences in the sectors to which migrants were recruited, with a German focus on expanding manufacturing sectors, contrasting both with a British emphasis on public services (and later on less competitive industries) and a French tendency for more migrants to go into private services/construction. In the UK, though the interest of West Indians in coming to Britain (and particularly London) was signalled by the arrival of The Empire Windrush at Tilbury in 1948, large scale migration from there only followed at the end of the 1950s, thanks to recruitment initiatives by London Transport, and of the National Health Service, continuing until it was largely cut off by the 1962 Immigration Act. Immigration to London continued through the 1960s though, with a new influx of south Asians, including refugees from Kenya and Uganda. Recruitment of large numbers of Pakistanis at this time to work in a number of increasingly uncompetitive manufacturing industries mostly brought migrants to northern cities rather than to London. As far as tradable goods were concerned, however, it became increasingly feasible and attractive to use cheap labour supplies in situ, by off-shoring work.
Halting the inflow: This planned importation was halted in the early-mid 1970s for reasons primarily associated with the oil price shock and rising unemployment in domestic economies, though British restrictions had come in earlier, for essentially political reasons. In the gastarbeiter countries, in particular, there was an expectation now that migrants would go home, reducing the size of the foreign-born population, for whom there was no longer an economic need. Even with strong encouragement in some places, this mostly did not occur. Cyclical (back and forward) movement was greatly reduced, however, facing earlier migrants with a much starker choice between permanently returning ‘home’, or staying on a more settled basis, which is what the great majority did. From the 1980s onward, government policies in the main migrant countries increasingly complemented restrictions on further primary immigration2 with efforts to enhance settlement and integration among previous immigrants, including acceptance of secondary migration as a means of family reunification.
New (Post-Fordist) migration: From the later 1980s, long-distance migration into western Europe revived on a much more heterogeneous and less managed basis. In particular, there was an upsurge in asylum-seeking (from eastern Europe and from war-torn areas of the Third World), in movements by the highly skilled, and in spontaneous economic migration by individuals from many areas of the world now in possession of much better information about available work opportunities abroad, both through globalised media, and contacts with earlier migrants. Though immigration controls remained in force they were less effective in stemming this new migration. Globally the numbers of people living outside their country of origin are estimated to have grown by 80% between 1980 and 2000. One factor in this was the great upsurge in refugee flows, principally from one Third World country to another, but also involving at the peak of asylum seeking in 2001 some 638 thousand arrivals in OECD countries (with some 15% coming to the UK).
The reduced role of major employers in shaping this new diverse set of flows, the much enlarged set of origins, and the increased representation of graduates in them all suggest that major cities (especially those with a range of established minority populations) should be of special significance as destinations for the new migration. At an international scale, the OECD( 2004) reports that current immigrant flows into advanced economies are particularly concentrated in areas which are: economically attractive, urban in character, close to relevant ports of entry, and with existing concentrations of potential immigrant groups.
London has certainly figured prominently in the upsurge of immigration to the UK over the past 20 years, typically receiving about 40% of the gross inflows (three times its population share). In net terms the concentration has been even more striking – indeed until the late 1990s London effectively accounted for 85-90% of additions to the UK’s migrant stock, coming down to 55-60% in the last 5 years, as migration has started to take off in other regions. The impact on London’s own population over the last 20 years has been dramatic, both quantitatively and qualitatively. The chronic population decline of the previous quarter century has been replaced by net growth (of around 50 thousand p.a.); the share of foreign born in the population has almost doubled over 20 years, reaching about one-third of the total, and the number of nationalities heavily represented among its residents has grown enormously, with a much larger proportion now coming from non-English speaking countries
YearForeign born populationTotal populationIrish born populationPercentage of total population that was born abroad
1851 100,000 17,900,000 520,000 0.6
1861 150,000 20,100,000 600,000 0.7
1871 200,000 22,700,000 565,000 0.9
1881 275,000 26,000,000 560,00 1.1
1891 350,000 29,000,000 460,000 1.2
1901 475,000 32,500,000 425,000 1.5
1911 900,000 36,100,000 375,000 2.5
1921 750,000 37,900,000 365,000 2
1931 1,080,000 40,000,000 380,00 2.7
1951 1,875,000 43,700,000 470,000 4.3
1961 2,290,000 46,000,000 645,000 5.0
1971 3,100,000 48,700,000 585,000 6.4
1981 3,220,000 48,500,000 580,000 6.6
1991 3,625,000 49,900,000 570,000 7.3
2001 4,600,000 52, 500,000 475,000 8.8
2011 7,500,000 56,000,000 400,000 13.4
What the real significance is for London of this population turnaround, and of the new migration which triggered it – beyond the simple addition of extra numbers to those living in the city – is the focus of the rest of this report. In some ways it might be argued that there is nothing essentially new about the influx which London (like New York) is now experiencing. The city has long experience of playing host to cultural elites (or cultural servants of the elite), to refugees and would be revolutionaries, to upwardly mobile people seeking an introduction to the world of affairs, and to larger numbers looking simply for work. What is novel about the present situation seems principally to be the coincidence of each of these kinds of flow, operating on a much larger scale, and from more countries of origins than London has ever experienced before.
1.2.Its population composition today
The demography of London is analyzed by the Office for National Statistics and data is produced for each of the Greater London wards, the City of London and the 32 London boroughs, the Inner London and Outer London statistical sub-regions, each of the Parliamentary constituencies in London, and for all of Greater London as a whole. Additionally, data is produced for the Greater London Urban Area. Statistical information is produced about the size and geographical breakdown of the population, the number of people entering and leaving country and the number of people in each demographic subgroup.
Race by borough
This table shows the proportion of each main race by London borough, as found in the 2011 census.
Local authorityWhiteMixedAsianBlackOtherBarnet64.1 4.8 18.5 7.7 4.9
Barking and Dagenham58.3 4.2 15.9 20 1.6
Bexley81.9 2.3 6.6 8.5 0.8
Brent36.3 5.1 34.1 18.8 5.8
Bromley84.3 3.5 5.2 6 0.9
Camden66.3 5.6 16.1 8.2 3.8
City of London78.6 3.9 12.7 2.6 2.1
Croydon55.1 6.6 16.4 20.2 1.8
Ealing49 4.5 29.7 10.9 6
Enfield61 5.5 11.2 17.2 5.1
Greenwich62.5 4.8 11.7 19.1 1.9
Hackney54.7 6.4 10.5 23.1 5.3
Haringey60.5 6.5 9.5 18.8 4.7
Harrow42.2 4 42.6 8.2 2.9
Havering87.7 2.1 4.9 4.8 0.6
Hammersmith and Fulham68.1 5.5 9.1 11.8 5.5
Hillingdon60.6 3.8 25.3 7.3 3
Hounslow51.4 4.1 34.4 6.6 3.6
Islington68.2 6.5 9.2 12.8 3.4
Kensington and Chelsea70.6 5.7 10 6.5 7.2
Kingston upon Thames74.5 3.9 16.3 2.5 2.7
Lambeth57.1 7.6 6.9 25.9 2.4
Lewisham53.5 7.4 9.3 27.2 2.6
Merton64.9 4.7 18.1 10.4 1.9
Newham29 4.5 43.5 19.6 3.5
Redbridge42.5 4.1 41.8 8.9 2.7
Richmond upon Thames86 3.6 7.3 1.5 1.6
Southwark54.3 6.2 9.4 26.9 3.3
Sutton78.6 3.8 11.6 4.8 1.3
Tower Hamlets45.2 4.1 41.1 7.3 2.3
Waltham Forest52.2 5.3 21.1 17.3 4.1
Wandsworth71.4 5 10.9 10.7 2.1
Westminster61.7 5.2 14.5 7.5 11.1
London has reached the highest population in its history - 8.6million - and it is also at its most diverse
One in three residents originally born abroad and in some areas half have a different country of birth to Britain
People originally from India make up the highest numbers, followed by those from Nigeria, Poland and Bangladesh
Capital's immigrant population will hit five million in 2031, when it will overtake British-born residents for first time
1.3. Problems that accompany migration gain
Opponents of tighter immigration control try and present the debate as being either ‘for’ or ‘against’ migration with a false policy choice of either allowing immigration or stopping it. This is obviously wrong. All countries have border controls and policies about who to admit and who to turn away. The relevant policy questions are around who and how many people are good for the UK. Since, immigration policy, just like any other policy area, should be managed in the best interests of the UK.
Concerns about the scale and impact of mass immigration can be dealt with while recognizing that migrants come here for a very understandable reason, to try to better their lives.
The Scale of Immigration
High levels of net migration to the UK are a relatively recent phenomenon. The UK has always experienced periods of immigration but never on the current scale.
In 1997 net migration (the number of people coming to the UK minus the number leaving) was just 47,000. In the years that followed it rose to well over 200,000 and peaked at 320,000 in 2005. Under the last Labour government (1997-2010) an extra 3.6 million foreign migrants arrived, while one million British citizens left.
The coalition government elected in 2010 pledged to reduce net migration to the ‘tens of thousands’. However, despite some reduction in migration from outside the European Union, net migration overall has not fallen.
The first figures published under the current Conservative government estimate that net migration was a record 330,000 for the year ending March 2015.
Why is the current level of immigration a problem?
High net migration has resulted in rapid population growth. The UK population has increased by an average of around 400,000 people a year since 2000 and currently stands at nearly 65 million. The Office of National Statistics project that the UK population will increase by a further five million over the next ten years bringing it to 70 million, and that it will carry on rising. The ONS state that around 60% of this increase will be down to future migrants and their children. The remaining population growth will come from the UK’s existing population, including births to immigrants already here.
The UK (and especially England) is already densely populated by international standards and has a chronic shortage of housing.
To cope with this population increase huge amounts will have to be spent on the expansion of school places, roads, rail, health and other infrastructure. This is at a time of budget deficit when public spending is being scaled back rather than increased.
Little economic benefit for the existing population and harmful for the worse off
Increased migration will not generate the extra tax revenue needed to pay for such infrastructure expansion. The only major inquiry ever conducted in the UK into the economic impact of immigration was carried out by the Select Committee on Economic Affairs of the House of Lords in 2007/08. In April 2008 they reported that “The overall fiscal impact of immigration is likely to be small, though this masks significant variations across different immigrant groups." These findings have been endorsed by the OECD which found in its annual report that ‘estimates of the fiscal impact of immigration vary, although in most countries it tends to be small in terms of GDP and is around zero on average across OECD countries.”
The UK economy is now in a period of economic growth that is forecast by the Office of Budget Responsibility to continue over the next few years. Mass immigration contributes a part of this growth, simply because more people make for a larger economy. It does not necessarily make for a better economy. The most recent OBR report assumed that current high levels of net migration would continue and that this additional inflow would add no more than a tenth of one per cent to GDP per head of the population. The House of Lords report previously referred to stated that "We have found no evidence for the argument, made by the government, business and many others, that net immigration - immigration minus emigration - generates significant economic benefits for the existing UK population."
The growing economy is creating more employment opportunities and the numbers of both UK born and migrants in employment are growing but the large pool of labour from abroad has been associated with continued low growth in earnings as employers have not had to offer higher wages. Mass immigration is likely to be holding back wages for those in direct competition for work, which is often those who are already low paid – both British born and earlier migrants alike.
Public opinion is clear. A large majority (76%) of the public want to see immigration reduced. That includes voters of all ethnicities. This is not surprising, we all share similar concerns.
The greater the number of new arrivals, the harder it is for everyone to become fully integrated in British society. Trevor Phillips, the former head of the Equalities and Human Rights Commission, warned back in 2005 that the UK was “sleep walking into segregation”. Reasonable levels of migration are key to achieving strengthened community relations.
1.4. What can be done?
The long term objective must be to stabilize the population growth of the UK.
This can only be achieved by reducing net migration to between 50 and 70,000 a year.
In 2014 there were an estimated 632,000 immigrants to the UK and 320,000 emigrants giving a figure for net migration of 312,000. Reducing net migration to between 50k and 70k; the level of the 1980s and 1990s, would still allow for substantial flows each way. It would have no impact on the increasing numbers of tourists and business visitors that we all want to see.
Some opponents claim that immigration cannot be controlled so it is fruitless to try. This is nonsense; the UK, like every other country, should be able to control immigration. Reflect for a moment on what the level of immigration from much of the developing world would be without a visa system and border controls.
What is needed is more effective immigration controls and enforcement of immigration law. A target for net migration remains essential for focusing government policy.
The largest source of net migration remains from outside the European Union, something over which the government has control. In recent years substantial reforms to non-EU immigration have taken place with the aim of reducing numbers.
The reforms included the raising of the skills requirement for non-EU workers, ensuring that students are genuine by interviewing applicants, raising the income threshold required to sponsor a non-EU spouse and shutting down large numbers of bogus colleges.
There is still considerable scope for action on outflows. Non-EU outflow has remained at around 100,000 per year despite the inflow reaching well above 300,000 at times. Steps have already been taken to make some legal migration more temporary so that fewer people are entitled to stay on and settle.
A further means of increasing outflows is to tackle illegal migration where people stay on even after their visas have expired. The re-introduction of exit checks at the UK border is a step towards identifying those who have stayed on illegally.
The Immigration Act 2014 has extended deportation powers, limited the extensive grounds for appeal currently available and imposed responsibilities on landlords and banks to carry out checks on immigration status. This needs to be backed up with the deterrent of removal. Too few illegal immigrants have been removed from the country each year, with enforced removals of immigration offenders averaging around 4,300 a year over the last nine years. This must be addressed by increasing enforcement efforts. Currently the government spends just 0.25% of total government expenditure on immigration control (see here). This is entirely inadequate.
The aim must be to get non-EU net migration back down to below 100,000 a year. Non-EU net migration has averaged 190,000 over the last ten years. In 2014 it was an estimated 197,000.
The next government must also address the issue of free movement of labour within the EU. This migration more than doubled over the course of the last Parliament and now stands at over 170,000 a year. It is likely to remain high in the medium term . While the principle of free movement is one that all member states sign up to, the European Union was until 2004, not only a smaller group of countries but a group that was also at similar levels of wealth. Today the European Union comprises 28 hugely different countries with a significant wealth disparity between the richest and poorest. In 2013 the UK had a GDP per capita of €29,600 (around £23,700) compared to Bulgaria at €5,500 (around £4,400). This creates a massive economic incentive to migrate from poorer to wealthier countries. There were no such disparities when the Treaty of Rome was signed or even when the UK joined, in 1973.
13. The government has publicly stated that it wishes to restrict access to benefits for EU migrants until they have been in the UK for four years. It is argued that this will reduce the incentive for EU migrants to come to the UK to take low paid jobs.
14. A further negotiating objective should be to ensure that EU migrants in the UK are subject to UK immigration law on non-EU family members. As EU rules stand, EU citizens are not subject to these rules, thus, absurdly, placing them in a more favorable position to that of British citizens when it comes to sponsoring a non-EU spouse and non-EU family members.
15. We will review the effectiveness of such measures in the light of the outcome of the negotiations.
More British citizens leave the UK than return each year. This means that foreign immigration is to some extent offset by net British emigration which has averaged around -60K in recent years. This is not in the government’s control.
Total Net Migration
Net migration from within the EU plus that from outside the EU needs to be brought down to about 130,000 a year. Allowing for British net migration of about 60,000 a year brings total net migration to the target level of between 50K and 70K a year.
Immigration policy is only one part of the effort to bring down net migration. Employers can too easily turn to migrants rather than provide training in the necessary skills or offer enough pay to people already in the UK. Employers should, therefore, be encouraged to pay reasonable wages, train people and where necessary invest in technology rather than take on overseas workers prepared to work for low wages. Supplementing the wages of low-paid EU workers with tax credits and housing benefit should also stop. Employers should pay wages that are sufficient for workers to maintain themselves and their families without support from the UK taxpayer. The state, as a major employer itself, also has a role to play in ensuring appropriate levels of pay and conditions together with education and training for workers in key areas of the public sector, such as health and social care.
In the longer term the use of ID cards, to tackle illegal working and to regulate access to public services, is essential.
A stronger society
Public concern about mass immigration of people of many different backgrounds is consistently clear and strong. We would like to see net migration reduced so that it is no longer an issue of public concern. This would help to ensure a harmonious society that continues to welcome migrants and the contribution they make to our society.
Chapter 2: What immigrants have brought to the life of London
The long centuries of contact between the peoples of different nationalities inside one country the UK means that there is a limit to their significant differences. Ethnic identity is more than a question of deciding which sports team to support. Non-whites (about 6% of the total British population) cannot, as white non-English groups can, choose when to advertise their ethnic identity and when not to.
In the past two decades, the UK has experienced a steady flow of net migrants into the economy. Net migration is a significant factor in the growth of the UK population. But, does this net migration help or hinder the UK economy?
So, I have decided to make a social poll among Londoners in Facebook. I am interested what sides of culture immigrants influence most. And it turned out that the economic impact is the most strong and visible. People from different ethnic groups and minorities constitute the backbone of the British economy. The second chapter is about my own research on this topic. I read some science works and have summed up them.
2.1. Impact of Immigration on GDP per Head
The gross domestic product of a country divided by the number of its citizens is regarded as the standard measure of the prosperity of the inhabitants of a country. In 2010, the UK’s GDP per head was ranked 21st in the world at around £21,500.
Ideally, in assessing the benefits of immigration, it is the GDP per head of the ‘resident’ population of the UK which should be the focus.
House of Lords Report
In 2008 the report of the Economic Affairs Committee of the House of Lords concluded “The overall conclusion from existing evidence is that immigration has very small impacts on GDP per capita, whether these impacts are positive or negative. This conclusion is in line with findings of studies of the economic impacts of immigration in other countries including the US.”
Migration Advisory Committee (MAC)
In November 2010, in its inquiry into the economic impacts of limiting immigration of skilled workers, the MAC sought to answer two questions concerning the effects of net migration on GDP per head: first, what sort of impact does immigration overall have? Second, what is the likely impact on GDP per head of skilled migrants – those in tiers 1 & 2 of the Points Based System? To answer these questions the MAC used calculations, based on the HM Treasury model of the economy, to see what would be the effect on GDP per head of a net reduction in immigration.
Taking the first question, the MAC referred to an estimate produced by HM Treasury that the impact of a reduction of 50,000 in annual net migration would have a “negligible” impact on GDP per head
“HM Treasury estimated that a reduction in annual net migration of 50,000 could result in a negligible one year reduction in GDP per capita growth”
Taking the second question, the MAC calculated that after one year of a fall of 10,000 in net migration the result would be that GDP per head would be 0.027 % lower, equivalent to £6. This is entirely negligible
“Second, we calculate the impact of a reduction in annual net migration of 10,000 on GDP per capita growth, by calculating GDP per head both before and after the reduction in annual net migration, and examining the change. We estimate that the one year impact of a reduction in net migration of 10,000 on GDP per capita growth would be -0.027 percentage points. That is, a reduction in net migration of 10,000 results in GDP per capita being 0.027 per cent lower in the following year.”
National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR)
NIESR, founded in 1938, is the UK’s longest established economic research institute. The NIESR have modelled the impact on the UK’s economy of the very big movement of labour – there was net migration of around 625,000 - into the UK between 2004 and 2009 from the eight Eastern European countries which joined the EU in 2004. The conclusion of their study is “…the long-run impact on GDP per capita is expected to be negligible.”
The critical issue for migration policy is to what extent, if any, does net immigration deprive members of the UK resident labour force of jobs and thus increase unemployment? The most recent data on employment (published by the Government in June 2012) found that employment of UK born people had fallen over the most recent twelve month period whilst employment of non-UK born people had increased:
“The number of UK born people in employment was 25.08 million in the three months to March 2012, down 8,000 on a year earlier. The number of non-UK born people in employment was 4.06 million, up 16,000 from a year earlier”.
Comparing employment levels at the end of March in 1997 with those at the end of March 2011, around 2.9 million additional jobs have been created over the 14 years since 1997: of these, around 75 per cent were taken by non-UK – born workers.
The results of academic studies which have looked into the effects of migration on the UK labour market are mostly inconclusive – research that demonstrates that there is no effect on unemployment has been contradicted by research coming to the opposite conclusion. However, the Government’s Migration Advisory Committee showed earlier in 2012 that there was evidence of a tentative negative impact of immigration on employment of UK-born workers.
The House of Lords reported:
“The available evidence is insufficient to draw clear conclusions about the impact of immigration on unemployment in the UK”.
In coming to this conclusion, the House of Lords report made one significant caveat: some studies it looked at concluded that migration had no impact on employment levels because of the lack of statistical ‘significance’ of their findings. The House of Lords report criticised this assumption:
“Professor Rowthorn also disagreed with the clear conclusion the Government has drawn from the DWP study and the previous study by Professor Dustmann. He pointed out that both studies did find relatively large but statistically insignificant effects of immigration on unemployment. He argued that finding effects that are statistically insignificant “does not mean that they are ‘small’, as the authors claim. It simply means that there is too much noise in the system to estimate them accurately” (p 8).Professor Richard Pearson also warned that studies such as that by the DWP have “severe methodological limitations” (p 485).”
4.2 Migration Advisory Committee
The MAC has published two reports on the economic impacts of migration. The first one, published in November 2010 and specifically focusing on the employment impact on UK workers of skilled migrants, concluded that overall negative impacts were unlikely but it did importantly conclude that there was “repeated anecdotal evidence” of “negative effects” being experienced by UK – born individuals at the local level and in certain occupations, specifically IT :
“Academic studies which inevitably average out the effects of immigration cannot provide the whole story of the effect of migration on employment. As discussed in Migration Advisory Committee (2009c), there is anecdotal evidence that migration may displace non-migrant workers in some circumstances. For example, there is some evidence that IT workers may be displaced by those entering through the intra-company transfer route. However, such effects are of a partial equilibrium nature. It is possible, but not proven, that if UK companies improve their efficiency by out-sourcing their IT work to foreign companies using migrant workers, this may allow those companies to be more competitive in foreign markets. It may also mean that some UK companies keep jobs within the UK that they would otherwise move offshore. As such, some displacement of UK IT workers is not inconsistent with positive net job creation in the UK as a whole.”
In a subsequent report – ‘Analysis of the Impacts of Migration’ – published in January 2012, the MAC did find a tentative negative relationship between the employment of ‘natives’ in the UK and non-EU migration (Para 25-6):
“We carried out our own analysis, examining the association between migration and native employment rates in Great Britain over the period 1975 to 2010. We found a tentative negative association between working-age migrants and native employment when the economy is below full capacity, for non-EU migrants and for the period 1995-2010. As a starting point for analysis, 100 additional non-EU migrants may cautiously be estimated to be associated with a reduction in employment of 23 native workers. But those migrants who have been in the UK for over five years are not associated with displacement of UK born workers. The change in the stock of the non-EU working age population between 2005 and 2010 was approximately 700,000. An associated displacement rate of 0.23 suggests that UK born employment was therefore 160,000 lower. Between 1995 and 2010 employment of non-British born working age people rose by approximately 2.1 million. Any associated displacement of British born workers was around 160,000 of the additional 2.1 million jobs held by migrants, or about 1 in 13. It would not be appropriate to assume the same impact in a time of strong economic growth, and further research and analysis of what to assume in such circumstances would be justified.”
National Institute of Economic and Social Research
NIESR in the study mentioned above found that over the six year period from 2004 to 2009, the impact on the UK’s unemployment rate of immigration into the UK from the eight Eastern European countries which joined the EU in 2004 was very small. Their modelling showed an average annual rate of increase in UK unemployment of 0.08 percentage points.
4.4 Office for National Statistics
ONS published official data on UK employment to the end of March 2011 in June 2011. This showed that over the year to the end of March 2011 the vast majority of jobs created in the UK had been taken by migrants:
“The number of UK born people in employment was 25.09 million in the three months to March 2011, up 77,000 on a year earlier. The number of non-UK born people in employment was 4.04 million, up 334,000 from a year earlier”.
Between the end of the first quarter of 1997 and the first quarter of 2011, there were almost 2.9 million additional persons employed in the UK, of whom almost three quarters – 2.1 million - were born outside the UK.
There are two impacts that net migration could have on wages: first, by expanding the labour supply, it might have an adverse effect on the level of wages overall; second, without effecting the average level of wages, it might have impacts on the wage distribution – the spread of wages from the most highly paid at the top to the least well paid at the bottom. In particular, in view of the disproportionate concentration of migrants in sectors of the economy that have had historically low wages – on those UK-born workers who earn the least.
All of the studies agree that no reliable conclusion can be come to about the impact of immigration on overall wage rates because those few academic studies that have been done have come to opposite conclusions. However, on the wage distribution, The MAC and House of Lords studies, together with another official research study commissioned by the Department of Communities and Local Government, did find significant effects of immigration on low earning UK-born workers.
Migration Advisory Committee
Looking at average wage levels in the UK, the MAC was unable to find any significant impacts of migration (Para. 7.88):
“The available empirical evidence finds, on average, little impact of migration on overall wages”
However, the MAC did find impacts on the wage distribution, with greater pay inequality and adverse impacts on the most poorly paid UK-born workers (Para. 7.100):
“In summary, the literature suggests small impacts of migration on average wages but notable effects across the wage distribution……….In contrast, the studies do broadly agree that migration is more likely to increase wages at the top of the distribution, and reduce wages at the bottom of the distribution. Consequently, migration may have caused the pay distribution to become more unequal than it otherwise would have been”.
5.2 House of Lords Report
On the wage distribution, the Economic Affairs Committee of the House of Lords arrived at a similar conclusion (Para. 78):
“The available evidence suggests that immigration has had a small negative impact on the lowest-paid workers in the UK, and a small positive impact on the earnings of higher-paid workers. Resident workers whose wages have been adversely affected by immigration are likely to include a significant proportion of previous immigrants and workers from ethnic minority groups”.
National Institute of Economic and Social Research
NIESR did not study wage distribution impacts, but it did report that its modelling found a small negative impact on real wage growth in the UK caused by net immigration from those countries that joined the EU in 2004.
5.4 Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG)
The report – “International Migration and Rural Communities” – was commissioned by the DCLG prior to the formation of the Coalition in May 2010 and published in March 2011. It is a study of the impact of migration on rural economies in England, mostly in the east of England, the South East and the South West where over 70 per cent of A8 migrants have settled, predominantly working in food manufacturing, agriculture and hotel and restaurants.
Whilst acknowledging the scale of the contribution of these migrants to these rural economies, the DCLG study noted the adverse impact of immigration on the wages of the most poorly paid UK-born workers they studied (3.2.1, page 46):
“…there is some evidence that suggests immigration has had a significant but small impact on wages of previous waves of lower-skilled migrant workers and that when the occupational structure of the UK workforce is taken into account, there is a negative impact on the wages of UK workers at the bottom of the occupational distribution.”
2.4. Fiscal Impacts
Fiscal impacts affect taxpayers. Assessment of them looks at the additional tax revenues generated by migrants and then compares these with the amount of public spending on those public services, like health or education, which migrants consume. Estimates of the net fiscal impact range from the positive to the negative, but all are characterized by being extremely small in relation to the size of the overall UK fiscal deficit – which, in 2011-12, is projected at around £120 billion. Table 1 shows a number of estimates produced in recent years by various researchers:
Table 12: Estimates of the Net Fiscal Impact of Immigration
Research SourceNet Fiscal Contribution (£ billion) YearHome Office (2002) 2.5 1999-2000
IPPR (2005) 1.9 1999-2000
IPPR 1.7 2000-01
IPPR 1.8 2001-02
IPPR -0.1 2002-03
MigrationWatchUK (2006) -1.0 1999-2000
Prof. Robert Rowthorn (2008) 0.6 2003-4
These estimates are different because of differences in assumptions used – for example, whether expenditure on children who have one migrant parent should be wholly allocated to the UK-born population when calculating fiscal impacts. Leaving differences aside, what all these estimates suggest is that any impacts, positive or negative, are likely to be very small.
The study noted that in determining whether immigrants have a negative or positive impact on public finances, any calculation is very sensitive to what costs and benefits are measured. There has been disagreement in particular about what costs should be included and whether allowance should be made for cost impacts specific to migrants – for example, the cost of providing translation services or extra educational resources for people whose first language is not English.
The report noted (Para 131-2):
“131. Professor Rowthorn showed that the results of fiscal impact studies depend not only on the treatment of children but also on a range of other factors including, for example, whether a proportion of defence costs are attributed to migrants. Different treatment of these factors leads to various estimates for the net fiscal impact of immigrants, ranging from -£5.3 billion to +£2.6 billion for 2003–04.Although it is “difficult to obtain an accurate picture of how immigration has affected public finances”, Professor Rowthorn concluded that the potential fiscal impact is small relative to the size of the total economy, ranging from the equivalent of -0.47% to +0.23% of GDP (p.6).”
“…the fiscal impact  is small compared to GDP and cannot be used to justify large-scale immigration”.
6.2 Migration Advisory Committee
In analysing any fiscal impacts, the MAC only looked at an atypical category of migrants – those skilled migrants in Tiers 1 & 2 of the Points Based System. Their report concluded that because of the high employment and earnings of workers in these categories, and their relatively youthful profile, it was “highly likely on average” that migrants in these categories would make a positive net fiscal contribution, without however being able to estimate the scale of this contribution.
The report also noted (Para. 7.132):
“Tier 1 and 2 migrants will age and, if they remain in the UK permanently, will make a greater call on state services that are increasingly consumed with age, such as pensions and healthcare. Temporary migration is more likely to have a positive effect on government finances than migration leading to settlement.”
Chapter 3: Rising level of Social stratification as a result of all processes
Through these developments it is clear that multiculturalism has had some effect on many aspects of daily life: the food Brits eat their social lives, the buildings around them, the people they associate with, the governments that govern them and, most importantly, their own outlook on the world.
Great Britain is a multicultural country with its rich history and specific foreign customs that have been forming for a long time. People from other countries come to the UK for different reasons and bring their own culture.
In the course of the work it became clear to me that multiculturalism has both: good as well as bad sides.
But I also came to the conclusion that immigration is a necessary part of life. It is what humanity has always done - move around, re-settle and integrate. And the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is a good example of multiculturalism with its good and bad sides.